Optical networks are vulnerable to physical layer attacks; wiretappers can improperly receive messages intended for legitimate recipients. Our work considers an aspect of this security problem within the domain of multimode fiber (MMF) transmission. MMF transmission can be modeled via a broadcast channel in which both the legitimate receiver's and wiretapper's channels are multipleinput-multiple-output complex Gaussian channels. Source-channel coding analyses based on the use of distortion as the metric for secrecy are developed. Alice has a source sequence to be encoded and transmitted over this broadcast channel so that the legitimate user Bob can reliably decode while forcing the distortion of wiretapper, or eavesdropper, Eve's estimate as high as possible. Tradeoffs between transmission rate and distortion under two extreme scenarios are examined: the best case where Eve has only her channel output and the worst case where she also knows the past realization of the source. It is shown that under the best case, an operationally separate source-channel coding scheme guarantees maximum distortion at the same rate as needed for reliable transmission. Theoretical bounds are given, and particularized for MMF. Numerical results showing the rate distortion tradeoff are presented and compared with corresponding results for the perfect secrecy case. E. C. Song, P. Cuff and H. V. Poor are with the
source-channel coding problem. Along the lines studied in a general setting in [6] , some results of which can be directly applied to MMF systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model and define the source-channel coding problem under two scenarios. In Section III, we provide theoretical bounds with source-channel coding for general broadcast channel when the channels are fixed. In Section IV, we apply the general results to the MMF model under the two scenarios. In Section V, we provide numerical evaluation to the MMF source-channel model under Hamming distortion. In Section VI, we discuss the generalization of this model to the case of random channels in which the channel state information (CSI) is not available to the transmitter. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude the paper and discuss open problems from this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A source node (Alice) has an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence S k that she intends to transmit over an MMF such that a legitimate user (Bob) can reliably decode the source sequence, while keeping the distortion between an eavesdropper (Eve) and Alice as high as possible. An M-mode MMF is modeled as a memoryless MIMO channel with input X, which is an M-dimensional complex vector. Unlike wireless MIMO which has a total power constraint, MMF channels have the following per mode power constraint averaged over n uses of the channel:
More generally (as in [3] ), we will consider a power constraint of the form
where Q ∈ {A ∈ H M ×M : A 0, A ii = 1} and H denotes the set of Hermitian matrices. One element in this set is the identity matrix I (constraint (1) ). We will focus on Q = I, and later in April 16 , 2013 DRAFT Section VI we will explain why this is the case of our particular interest. A detailed discussion of the MMF channel model can be found in [1] . This is a joint source-channel coding problem.
The source sequence S k is mapped to the channel input sequence X n through a source-channel encoder.
A. The Legitimate User Communications Model
The channel between Alice and Bob is complex, Gaussian, MIMO, with input X ∈ C M as described above, and output Y ∈ C M given by
where N ∼ CN (0, σ 2 N I, 0) is M-dimensional, uncorrelated, zero-mean, complex, Gaussian noise and H is an M × M complex matrix. Bob's channel matrix H is of the form
where Ψ ∈ C M ×M is unitary and E 0 L is a constant scalar that measures the average power of the channel. We refer to E 0 L/σ 2 N as the SNR of the channel.
Matrix Ψ, the unitary factor of the channel H, describes the modal crosstalk [1] . Ψ is uniformly distributed among all unitary matrices in C M ×M , but Ψ stays constant during n channel uses. The CSI (the actual realization of Ψ) is known only to the receiver but is unknown to the transmitter due to the long round-trip delay over large distances common in optical transmission.
Upon receiving Y n , Bob makes an estimateŜ k of the original source sequence S k . For almost lossless reconstruction, we require the probability that Bob's reconstruction differs from the original goes to zero asymptoticly with the source blocklength. That is,
B. The Eavesdropper Communications Model
The channel between Alice and Eve is also complex, Gaussian, MIMO, with input X ∈ C M as described above, and output Z ∈ C M given by
where
noise, and H e is an M × M complex matrix. Eve's channel matrix H e is of the form
where Ψ e ∈ C M ×M is unitary, Φ is diagonal with positive entries, and E 0 L e is the average power of Eve's channel.
Note that Eve has a different signal to noise ratio SNR e = E 0 L e /σ 2 N e . The channel matrix has a unitary component Ψ e which is statistically the same as Ψ. The diagonal component of Φ corresponds to the mode-dependent loss (MDL) as introduced in [1] . The diagonal matrix Φ is also random, and its distribution will be discussed later in Section VI. It is assumed that Ψ, Ψ e and Φ are constant throughout the block and the eavesdropper has the CSI. We will examine two extreme cases based on the amount of side information Eve has. 
1) No causal information available to Eve:
The case in which Eve has only her own channel output but no side information about the source corresponds to the best scenario for the legitimate 
The system model is shown in Fig. 1 ; however, the dashed line represents additional information that is not available to the eavesdropper in this first scenario. We use the lower case t k (z n ) to denote Eve's deterministic estimation functions of her observation z n and the capital letter
to denote the function of the random variable Z n . The following definitions in this section are for constant fixed channels.
Definition 1. For a given distortion function d(s, t), a rate distortion pair (R, D) is achievable
if there exists a sequence of encoder/decoder pairs f k,n and g k,n such that
Note that the rate-distortion pair (R, D) captures the tradeoff between Bob's rate for reliable transmission and Eve's distortion, which is different from rate-distortion theory in the traditional sense.
2) With causal information available to Eve:
On the other hand, we are also interested in the case in which, at each time instance j, Eve gets to see the past realization of the source sequence S j−1 . This would be the worst scenario for the legitimate users. The definition for an achievable rate distortion pairs (R, D) is similar to Definition 1 given in the previous subsection except the last condition is replaced by
The system model is shown in Fig. 1 with dashed line representing the availability of the causal information. The maximum distortion ∆ is defined as
In the next section we apply results from [6] and [7] to our source-channel setting for a general broadcast channel. However, the results in [7] were not derived in the context of a noisy communication channel. Extending [7] for the noisy channel case of interest in this work turns out to require a so-called "strong secrecy" channel coding proof. This is presented in Section III. In the following sections, we apply the theoretical results to the MMF channels by choosing proper auxilliary random variables. Finally we will discuss how this can be generalized to random channels when no CSI is available at the transmitter.
III. THEORETICAL BOUNDS
In this section, instead of focusing on MMF, we consider a more general problem in which the channel is any noisy memoryless broadcast channel. Let P Y Z|X denote the transition probability of the broadcast channel in each use. We first make some general observations on the communi- We now state the rate-distortion result for general source-channel coding with an i.i.d. source sequence and a discrete memoryless broadcast channel P Y Z|X when no causal information is available to Eve. In the following theorem, we will see that the source sequence can be delivered almost losslessly to Bob at a rate arbitarily close to R 0 while the distortion to Eve is kept at ∆, as long as the secrecy capacity is positive. We use the symbol − − to denote a Markov relation. 
Remark: The requirement R s = I(W ; Y ) − I(W ; Z) > 0 implies the existence of a secure channel with a positive rate, i.e. the eavesdropper's channel is not less noisy than the intended receiver's channel. So instead of demanding a high secure transmission rate R s as in perfect
we only need to ensure the existence of a secure channel regardless of the actual rate R s as long as it is strictly positive.
The converse is straightforward. Each of the inequalities (8) and (9) is true individually for any channel and source, (8) by channel capacity coupled by optimality of source-channel separation, and (9) by definition.
This paper proposes a source-channel coding scheme that can achieve the rate and distortion in Theorem 1. The scheme is based on recent work in [6] . The idea for achievability is to DRAFT April 16, 2013 operationally separate the source and channel coding (see Fig. 2 ). The source encoder compresses the source and splits the resulting message into a private message and a non-private message. A channel encoder is cancatenated digitally with the source encoder so that the channel delivers both the private and non-private messages reliably to Bob and keeps the private message secret from Eve, as in [8] . The overall source-channel coding rate will have the following form:
, where |M| is the total cardinality of the private and the non-private messages; R ch and R src are the channel coding and source coding rates, respectively.
Let us look at two models in the following subsections that will help us establish the platform for showing the achievability of Theorem 1. 
A. Channel Coding and Strong Secrecy
Consider a memoryless broadcast channel P Y Z|X and a communication system with a private message M s and a non-private message M p that must allow the intended receiver to decode both M s and M p while keeping the eavesdropper from learning anything about M s . Problems like this were first studied by Csiszár and Körner [8] in 1978, as an extension of Wyner's work in [9] . Their model differs from ours in that, the second receiver (the eavesdropper in our case)
is required to decode the public message M p . The mathematical formulation and result of our channel model is stated below. We focus on the message pairs (M s , M p ) whose distribution satisfies the following and a channel decoder g c such that
satisfying (10) , there exists a sequence of (R s , R p , n) channel codes such that
Note that because the eavesdropper may completely or partially decode M p , the secrecy requirement is modified accordingly to consider
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3 in [6]). A rate pair (R s , R p ) is achievable under weak secrecy if
The proof can be found in [6] . Let us denote the above region as R. We now strengthen the result by considering strong secrecy introduced in [10] . Later we will use strong secrecy to connect the operationally separate source and channel encoders. For simplicity, we consider only the case in which |Z| is finite in the following. Generalization to Z = R can be done by considering Z ∆ , a quantized version of Z, as in [11] . The following two lemmas will assist the proof of Theorem 3 by providing a sufficient condition for satisfying the secrecy constraint lim n→∞ I(M s ; Z n |M P ) = 0.
, then
This lemma was also discussed in [12] and its proof can be found in [13] .
Lemma 2.
If for every (m s , m p ), there exists a measure θ mp on Z n such that
where ǫ n = 2 −nβ for some β > 0.
A proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A. 
and the message pair generated by the source encoder satisfies P Ms|Mp=mp (m s ) = 2
and
The general idea for achievability is to consider the ǫ-typical S k sequences and partition them into bins of equal size so that each bin contains sequences of the same type. The identity M p of the bin is revealed to all parties, but the identity M s of each sequence inside a bin is perfectly protected. 1 Each of such partitions is treated as a codebook. It was shown in [7] that, for the noiseless case in which Eve is given m p instead of z n , the distortion averaged over all such codebooks achieves the maximum distortion ∆ as k → ∞ and therefore there must exists one partition that achieves ∆. In order to transition from their result to our claim in Theorem 4, we only need to show
Proof: First, observe that
Next, we claim the channel output sequence z n does not provide Eve anything more than m p and therefore
The analysis is similar to [6] , but for the sake of clarity, we present the complete proof of (14) in Appendix B.
1 Strictly speaking, the source encoder may violate the condition (10) on (k + 1) |S| number of bins, because (k + 1) |S| is an upper bound on the number of types of sequence with length k. However, this is just a very small (polynomial in k) number of bins compared with the total number (roughly 2 kH(S) ) of bins. Therefore, for this small portion of "bad" bins that violates (10), we can just let the source encoder declare an error on the private message Ms and constructs the dummy Ms uniformly given the bin index mp. This will only contribute some ǫ factor to the error probability.
Finally, combining (14) with (13) give us the desired result.
C. Achievability of Theorem 1
With all the elements from Section III-A and III-B, we are now ready to harvest the achievability proof of Theorem 1 using Theorems 2 and 4 by concatenating the channel encoder to the source encoder.
We apply the same codebook construction and encoding scheme as in Section III-B by partioning the ǫ-typical S k sequences into 2 kRp ′ bins and inside each bin we have 2 kRs ′ sequences so that
Recall that all the sequences inside one bin are of the same type, so it is guaranteed that
Let R s and R p be the channel rates and R p (R s ) be the outer boundary of the region given Thus, R p achieves the maximum at R s = 0, which would be the channel capacity max X I(X; Y ) of P Y |X for reliable transmission. By the continuity of
is achievable under strong secrecy, i.e.
From the above good channel code under strong secrecy we have P Z n |MsMp such that I(M s ; Z n |M p ) → 0. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 4 to achieve
The error probability is bounded by the sum of the error probabilities from the source coding and channel coding parts i.e. P[S k =Ŝ k ] < 2ǫ. Finally, we verify the total transmission rate to DRAFT April 16, 2013 complete the proof:
We next state the rate-distortion result for source-channel coding with an i.i.d. source sequence and discrete memoryless broadcast channel P Y Z|X when causal information is available to Eve.
The result comes from the rate matching of [6] .
Theorem 5. For an i.i.d. source sequence S k and a memoryless broadcast channel P Y Z|X , a rate distortion pair (R, D) is achievable if
for some distribution P S P U |S P V P W |V P X|W P Y Z|X , where α = .
IV. MMF MAIN RESULTS
We now return to the MMF model introduced in Section II. With the theoretical results obtained from the previous section, we have the tools needed to find the rate distortion regions for the MMF model defined in (3) and (5) under the two scenarios. In this section, we assume the channels are constant. First of all, we will give the achievable rate region under strong secrecy (therefore also under weak secrecy).
Theorem 6. The following rate region for one private and one non-private message is achievable under strong secrecy for a complex Gaussian channel:
for some K and Q, where 0 K Q, K ∈ H M ×M , Q satisfies the power constraint in (2), and H and H e are the channel gain matrices.
Proof: According to Theorem 2 and 3,
for some V − −W − −X− −Y Z and E[XX † ] ≤ Q, is an achievable rate pair.
We restrict the channel input X to be a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vectors. Let
such that B and V are independent, and W = X = V + B. Therefore, X ∼ CN (0, Q, 0) satisfies the power constraint. Similar to [3] , the rate pair (R s , R p ) satisfying inequalities (15) and (16) can be achieved.
An immediate corollary follows directly from the above theorem.
Corollary 1. The following rate pairs are achievable under strong secrecy for MMF with channel
gains defined in (4) and (6) and equal full power allocation Q = I:
for some K where
With the secrecy capacity region of MMF, we can evaluate its rate distortion region (R, D)
under the two extreme cases, without and with causal information at Eve's decoder respectively.
For the best case scenario (no causal information), we will give a sufficient condition to force maximum distortion ∆ between Alice and Eve. For the worst case scenario (with causal information), we will give an achievable rate-distortion region and look at the particular case of
Hamming distortion, defined as: 
is the linear interpolation of the points (log n,
The result given in Theorem 8 can be derived directly from Theorem 5 and Corollary 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results illustrating achievable rate distortion regions of an MMF under the two information models. Let us consider measuring the eavesdropper's distortion using Hamming distortion and a Bern(p) i.i.d. source sequence. Fig. 3 shows numerical results corresponding to Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 under equal power allocation. The channels are simulated as a 4−mode MMF with SNR = 20dB, SNR e = 10dB, and MDL = 20dB.
In each plot, the vertical line on the right is the maximum reliable transmission rate between Alice and Bob and the vertical line on the left is the maximum perfect secrecy transmission rate that can be obtained with separate source-channel coding. The horizontal line is the maximum distortion which is also the rate distortion curve from Theorem 7 with no causal information at Eve. The curve obtained from Theorem 8 shows the tradeoff between the transmission rate between Alice and Bob and the distortion forced to Eve with causal information. We see in Fig. 3(a) , p = 0.3, that with our source-channel coding analysis, we gain a free region (from the left vertical line to the kink) for maximum distortion as if under perfect secrecy because we here made better use of the redundancy of the source. In Fig. 3(b) with p = 0.5, since there is no redundancy in the source, the distortion curve drops immediately after the maximum perfect secrecy rate. Note that the transmission rates are not considered beyond the right vertical 
VI. RANDOM CHANNEL
So far, we have only considered the rate distortion tradeoff under deterministic channels H and H e , i.e. the transmitter and receivers know the channel matrix before they design the codes and the channels stay constant. In the previous sections, we showed the existence of sourcechannel codes that guarantee a designed level of distortion inflicted on an eavesdropper under two different information assumptions. However, in MMF, the channels H and H e vary with time and the CSI is not available at the transmitter even though it has a long coherence time.
Recall from Section II, the randomness of H = √ E 0 LΨ and Since the channels have long coherence times, the average performance is typically measured by outage probability. We define the outage probability of rate C out under power allocation strategy Q to be
is the "secrecy capacity" (maximum rate for perfect secrecy) under power allocation Q of the MMF system. Note that R s (Q) is a random variable because the channels P Y Z|X are now random. The capacity C = max Q log |I + HQH † | and secrecy capacity C s = max Q [log |I +HQH † |−log |I +H e QH e † |] for a deterministic MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel were given in [14] and [15] , respectively.
For random channels, typically, an outage occurs (i.e. R s (Q) < C out ), if either reliable transmission to the legitimate receiver fails or perfect secrecy is violated. However, because of the unitary property of the MMF channel, the maximum reliable transmission rate under power allocation strategy Q is constant at log |I + SNR · Q| which does not depend on the distribution of Ψ. Therefore, there is only one interpretation for outage, i.e. the perfect secrecy condition is violated. Under the MMF model, we have the corresponding
Hence, (26) can be written as
We must now determine which power allocation strategy Q gives the smallest outage probability for a given C out . It has been shown quantitatively in [16] that equal full power allocation Q = I minimizes the outage probability given in (26). This explains why we focus on the case Q = I in earlier sections. 
where ǫ n = 2 −nβ for some β > 0 Then we have the following:
where (29) follows from triangle inequality and (30) follows from (27).
By applying Lemma 1, we have
where (32) goes to 0 as n → ∞.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF (14)
For each i, we have for large enough n. (33) follows from strong secrecy of the channel and Fano's inequality. We now define P i P S i Z n Mp P i P Mp P S i |Mp P Z n |Mp i.e.P i is the Markov chain S i − −M p − −Z n . By Pinsker's inequality,
= min t(i,mp)
≥ min
where (35) and (37) use the fact that P i andP i are close in total variation from (34); (36) uses the Markov relation S i − −M p − −Z n of distributionP i . The technical details can be found in Lemma 2 and 3 from [6] . Averaging over k, we obtain (14) . 
However, (40) is computationally heavy to verify. If we restrict K to be of the form K = Ψ e † ΛΨ e where Λ is diagonal with diagonal entries λ i ∈ [0, 1], then (40) has a much simpler form:
Therefore, if there exists a j ∈ {1, ..., M} such thatφ j <
SNR SNR
e , we can choose λ j = 1 and λ i = 0 for i = j to satisfy (41).
